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CONGRESS AS CULPRIT: 
HOW LAWMAKERS SPURRED ON THE 
COURT'S ANTI-CONGRESS CRUSADE 
NEALDEVINSt 
INTRODUCTION 
Poor Congress. Twenty-seven of its laws have been struck down 
in just over six years.1 According to the New York Times, Congress is 
now "The High Court's Target."2 And to law professors, the Court is 
increasingly "obliterating a role for Congress as a separate institu-
tion"3-so much so that examining the "Causes of the Recent Tum in 
Constitutional Interpretation" and sorting out whether it is time to 
Copyright© 2001 by Neal Devins. 
t Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of \Vtlliam and 
Mary. This Essay is a response to Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of tile Recent Tum in Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE W. 307 (2001), presented at the Constitution in E.~le con-
ference hosted by the Program in Public Law at Duke University School of Law on October 5-
7, 2000. Thanks to Chris Schroeder for inviting me to the conference, to ~1ichnel Dry and Adina 
Dziuk for helping me research this Essay, and to Lou FISher, Bob Nagel, Suzanna Sherry, Bill 
Treanor, and Keith Whittington for helpful comments. 
1. From Aprill995 to June 2000, the Court declared unconstitutional twenty-three fed-
eral statutes. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tippil1g Poilll, 32 NAT'L J. 1810, 1811 (2000). In its 2001 
Term, the Court invalidated aU or part of four federal statutes. Linda Greenhouse, In lite Year 
of Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Mud1 Other Work, N.Y. nMES, July2. 2001, at Al2. 
2. Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target: Congress, N.Y. nMES, Feb. 25, 2001, § 4, 
at3. 
3. I d. (quoting Robert Post, Alexander F. and May T. Morrison Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley School of Law); see also Christopher Bryant &. Tunothy J. 
Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "Or1 the Recortl" Conslilulional 
Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 328, 332-354, 369-388 (2001) (noting the Su-
preme Court's increased scrutiny of legislative records in its recent rulings on the constitution-
ality of federal statutes, and concluding, ultimately, that this approach is an unwarranted intru-
sion into the congressional sphere); Larry Kramer, Tile Arrogance of tile Court, WASH. POST, 
May 23, 2000, at A29 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's overturning of the Violence Against 
Women Act is indicative of the Supreme Court's recent tendency to interfere \\ith tile legisla-
tive process). 
HeinOnline -- 51 Duke L.J. 436 2001-2002
436 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:435 
bring the "Constitution in Exile" in from the cold seem anything but 
academic exercises. 4 
Notwithstanding this hue and cry, Congress seems a bit oblivious 
to its fate. Although the Democratically controlled Senate Judiciary 
Committee may soon take recent Supreme Court decisionmaking into 
account when confirming President George W. Bush's judicial nomi-
nees, Congress has yet to strike back at the Court in any meaningful 
way. Indeed, rather than condemn the Court and launch a counter-
offensive, Congress has paid little notice to the Court's decisionmak-
ing. If anything, as I will argue in this Essay, Congress had been (and 
still may be) spurring the Court into action by signaling its indiffer-
ence to the constitutional fate of its handiwork. First, Congress, 
through word and deed, increasingly treats the Court as if it is the ul-
timate interpreter of the Constitution. Second, unless responding to a 
Supreme Court decision invalidating federal legislation, Congress has 
shown little interest in taking Court rulings into account when craft-
ing constitutionally problematic laws. Third, by slowing down the 
confirmation process, by failing to increase the salaries of federal 
judges, and by disregarding calls to limit federal court litigation to 
matters that are truly national, Congress has made the job of being a 
federal judge less desirable. 
For all these reasons, the Court has had little incentive to ac-
commodate Congress and, if anything, it may see the invalidation of 
some federal statutes as a way both to assert its own power and to pay 
Congress back for its insensitive management of the courts. Further-
more, there has been little reason for the Justices to fear reprisal. 
Congress's rhetoric emphasizes the supremacy of the Court's inter-
pretation of the Constitution. Moreover, the Justices' invalidation of 
federal statutes has left intact analogous state programs and, for the 
most part, allowed Congress to revisit issues by recrafting the invali-
dated statutes. 
In calling attention to how Congress's attitudes toward both the 
Court and the Constitution may have factored into the Court's deci-
sionmaking, I see my project as complementing Christopher Schroe-
der's examination of recent decisions invalidating federal statutes.$ 
4. I refer here, of course, to this conference, especially Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes 
of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307 (2001). See also William W. 
Van Alstyne, Foreword: The Constitution in Exile: Is It Time to Bring It in from the Cold?, 51 
DUKE LJ. 1 (2001). 
5. See generally Schroeder, supra note 4 (suggesting that the Rehnquist Court's federalism 
opinions are motivated by a distrust of the federal government). 
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Specifically, just as the social norm of distrust in the federal govern-
ment affects the Court's understanding of the deference it owes Con-
gress,6 the Court is likewise affected by its "inside the Washington, 
D.C., beltway" impressions of Congress. 
Before turning to my examination of Congress's role in precipi-
tating the current constitutional moment,7 I think it useful to take 
note of how the 1930s Congress-through sloppy legislative draft-
ing-prompted some of the Court's anti-New Deal activism. In other 
words, to the extent that today's Congress is fueling a return to the 
"exiled" pre-New Deal Constitution, the past is certainly prologue. 
I. LESSONS FROM THE 1937 CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
Congress played an instrumental role both in prompting the 
Court to repudiate several early New Deal statutes and in facilitating 
the Court's subsequent embrace of the New Deal.8 Consider, for ex-
ample, two statutes invalidated by the Court-the Railroad Retire-
ment Act of 19349 and the Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act of 
1934.10 Congress, when enacting the Retirement Act, "whipped the 
legislation through," with the House "consider[ing] it for only forty 
6. Id. at351-59. 
7. See infra notes 25-116 and accompanying text (assessing Congress's responsibility for 
the Supreme Court's willingness to overturn legislation); Sl!l! also Schroeder, supra note 4, at 
315-22 (summarizing Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments). 
8. I make this point in Neal Devins, Govm1mt!ll1 La•vyt!rs and tile NeiV Deal, 96 COLUM. 
L REV. 137, 250--61 (1996). For a more comprehensive (but somewhat different) treatment of 
this subject, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCfURE OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 9--47 (1998) [hereinafter CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW 
DEAL COURT] (approaching changes in the constitutional jurisprudence of the New Deal era as 
part of a continuous historical thread); Barry Cushman, Tilt! Hugl!es Court ancl Constitlltiona/ 
Consultation, 1998 J. SUP. Cr. H!ST. 79, 80 [hereinafter Cushman, T11e Hugl!es Court] (arguing 
that the Hughes Court played a distinctly consultative role during the economic and political 
crises of the 1930s, supplying Congress with frequent constitutional counsel). Unlike Cushman, I 
think there is a real divide between pre- and post-1937 dccisionmaking. After all, the New Deal 
Court, from 1937 to 1947, overturned thirty-two prc-1937 decisions. C. HERMAN PRITCHEIT, 
THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947, at 300--01 
(1948); see also Schroeder, supra note 4, at 330 (reasoning that post-1937 decisions were not 
compelled by prior decisions). For further discussion, see infra note 91 and accompanying text 
(discussing the significance of the fact that the Rchnquist Court, while striking down numerous 
federal statutes, rarely calls earlier precedent into question). 
9. Railroad Retirement Act, Pub. L No. 73-485,48 Stat. 1283 (1934), im•a/i'datetl in R.R. 
Ret. Bd. v. Alton RR Co., 295 U.S. 330,362 (1935). 
10. Amendment of June 28, 1934 to § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 
544, invalidated in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935). 
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minutes before registering its approval."11 Because Congress failed, 
among other things, to build a record to support the measure's impact 
on interstate commerce, Justices sympathetic to the statutory scheme 
complained that the government did not present its case in a con-
vincing way.12 
The Debt Relief Act likewise "inspired a storm of controversy 
[over] its validity."13 Criticized as "one of the worst recent examples 
of draftsmanship in federal legislation," the bill was "hastily drafted 
and hurriedly passed" by a "harried Congress."14 When signing the 
measure, Franklin Delano Roosevelt spoke of the bill as "loosely 
worded ... [and] requir[ing] amendment at the next session of Con-
gress."15 These words proved prophetic, for, immediately after the act 
was invalidated in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford/6 
Louis Brandeis, the opinion's author, lamented that "[t]he President 
has been living in a fool's paradise .... I should not be surprised if 
everything would have to be redrafted. "17 
The Railroad Retirement and Debt Relief Acts typify early New 
Deal legislation-not well-drawn and tying "sweeping assertions of 
federal power to slap-dash justifications."18 Senate Judiciary Chair-
man Henry Ashurst described the period this way: "We ground out 
laws so fast .... [we] reasoned from non-existent premises and, at 
times, we seemed to accept chimeras, phantasies and exploded social 
and economic theories as our authentic guides. "19 Along the same 
lines, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone spoke of "[t]he general sloppiness of 
everything that has been done in connection with this effort" and his 
11. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTION· 
AL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 32 {1995). 
12. For example, Benjamin Cardozo suggested that the Justice Department, by analogizing 
the statute "to a workman's compensation act," could have compensated for gaps left open by 
Congress. I d. at 41 {discussing a memorandum drafted by Justice Cardozo). 
13. F. Carlisle Roberts, The New Frazier-Lemke Act-Its Provisions, Its Constitutionality, 
22 A.B.A. J. 15, 15 {1936). For additional sources, see Cushman, The Hughes Court, supra note 
S,at 97 n.6. 
14. Cushman, The Hughes Court, supra note 8, at 81 (quoting various sources). 
15. Roosevelt Signs Farm, Rail Bills, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1934, at 21. 
16. 295 u.s. 555, 602 {1935). 
17. Cushman, The Hughes Court, supra note 8, at 81 (quoting Richard D. Friedman, Char-
les Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 1930-1941: The Complexities of Moderation 231 {1978) (un-
published PhD. dissertation, Oxford University)). 
18. Michael Nelson, The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Courtpacking Episode 
of I937, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 267,289 {1988). 
19. HENRY F. AsHURST, A MANY COLORED TOGA: THE DIARY OF HENRY FOUNTAIN 
AsHURST 333 {1962). 
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"hope that Congress will now undertake to do its job."20 Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes complained that "the laws have been poorly 
drafted, the briefs have been badly drawn and the arguments have 
been poorly presented."21 
Failings of Congress, of course, tell only part of the story. After 
all, had the Court wanted to uphold these programs, the legal land-
mines that the Justices deployed to limit federal power never would 
have been devised in the first place. At the same time, the Court's 
willingness, starting in 1937, to sign on to the New Deal is partially at-
tributable to Congress's decision to take tlte Court's rulings into ac-
count when crafting legislation. Unlike the "loose draftsmanship and 
emotional advocacy" of the First New Deal, observed Arthur 
Schlessinger, the laws of this "Second New Deal were masterpieces of 
the lawyer's art."22 
The lesson here is simple: Congress cannot turn its back on the 
Court and expect to get away with it. Indeed, public acceptance of ju-
dicial independence and supremacy ultimately proved damaging both 
to Roosevelt and his proposal to pack the Court with Justices "wllo 
will bring to the Courts a present-day sense of tlte Constitution."23 
And while the Justices came to realize that the Court could not resist 
"the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the country,"2~ 
20. ALPHEUS T. MAsON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILlAR OF THE LAw 395 (1956) (quoting 
a letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to John Basset Moore dated May 30, 1935). FolloY.ing the 
Court's invalidation of the Roosevelt administration's 1933 "hot oil" program, Justice Owen 
Roberts sounded a similar message, informing Interior Secretary Harold Ickes that he was "en-
tirely sympathetic with what [the administration wasltrying to do in the oil matter and that he 
hoped we would pass a statute that would enable [the administration constitutionally tol carry 
out [its] policy." 1 HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE FIRST 
1HOUSAND DAYS, 1933-36, at273 (1953) (diary entry ofJan.ll, 1935). 
21. BURTON K. WHEELER WITH PAUL F. HEALY, YANKEE FROM THE WEST 329 (1%2). 
On the issue of how poor Justice Department lawyering contributed to the Court's invalidation 
of early New Deal legislation, see Devins, supra note 8, at 251-53. See also Setll P. Wn.mmn, 
Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2001) (contrasting 
the early New Deal period to today and, in so doing, arguing that Rehnquist Court efforts to 
limit congressional power are impervious to high quality government lawyering). 
22. ARTHUR M SCHLESSINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POUTICS OF 
UPHEAVAL 395 (1960). 
23. 6 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1HE PUBUC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKUN D. 
ROOSEVELT 127 {Samuel L Rosenman ed., 1941). For analysis, see RICHARD POLENBERG, 
REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT'S GOVERNMENT 148-94 (1966) (detailing the fallout from Roose-
velt's failed Court-packing plan); Barry Friedman, The History of the Coulltemzajoritarian Diffi-
culty, Part Four: Law's Polilics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1022-28 (2000) (highlighting public 
support for the Court during the Court-packing episode). 
24. OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1951); see also CHARLES 
E. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 24 {1928) (noting that, when the 
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the Court, by calling attention to the poor quality of Congress's work, 
was able to cast Congress as a coconspirator in the demise of much 
early New Deal legislation. 
What is striking here, as the next section of this Essay will detail, 
is how today's constitutional counterrevolution parallels the revolu-
tion of 1937. By giving short shrift both to Supreme Court decisions 
and to its own role as coequal interpreter of the Constitution, Con-
gress has helped pave the way for the Rehnquist Court to reinvigor-
ate the "Constitution in Exile." 
II. CONGRESS AND THE RETURN OF THE "CONSTITUTION IN EXILE" 
At the end of the Court's 2000 Term, Justice Antonin Scalia took 
aim at Congress. Complaining that '"Congress is increasingly abdi-
cating its independent responsibility to be sure that it is being faithful 
to the Constitution,'"25 Scalia minced no words in placing the blame 
for Court invalidations of federal statutes at Congress's door. Fur-
thermore, Scalia made clear that the pace of Court rulings invalidat-
ing federal statutes is likely to quicken. "[I]f Congress is going to take 
the attitude that it will do anything it can get away with and let the 
Supreme Court worry about the Constitution," warned Scalia, "then 
perhaps th[ e] presumption [of Congress acting constitutionally] is 
unwarranted. "26 
Scalia's comments, of course, are self-serving. In pointing to 
Congress's misdeeds, Scalia (never hinting that the Court is sharply 
divided) suggested that the Justices have little choice but to strike 
down the abominations that Congress is throwing its way.21 More to 
Court departs from "its fortress in public opinion," it may well suffer from self-inflicted 
wounds). 
25. Taylor, supra note 1, at 1811. 
26. ld. 
27. Here, I think, is where I part company with Professor Schroeder. While it is certainly 
true that increasingly negative attitudes toward the federal government help create the occasion 
for the Justices to engage in "motivated reasoning" and strike down federal legislation, I think 
Schroeder pays insufficient attention to the fact that the Court often divides five to four in these 
cases. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 {1997) (invalidating part of the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act in a 5-4 decision); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 
{1996) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act in a 5-4 decision); see also Schroeder, supra 
note 4, at 310 (mentioning that the central decisions of the post-Lopez Court arc identical 5-4 
votes). Specifically, if negative attitudes toward government explain the recent shift in Court 
decisionmaking, why are four Justices {including the two newest members of the Court) insensi· 
tivc to this phenomenon? Indeed, had AI Gore become president, there is every reason to think 
that a Gore appointee would have discounted this growing distrust of Congress and, in so doing, 
shifted the balance on the Court to those favoring pro-Congress rulings. By way of contrast, as I 
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the point, Scalia and other Justices willing to curtail Congress's pow-
ers are ideologically predisposed to limit lawmakers' prerogatives 
and, in so doing, to hear cases where they can point the finger at Con-
gress for overstepping its enumerated powers.28 Nevertheless, there is 
reason to think that there are several kernels of truth in Scalia's re-
buke. Congress does seem disinterested both in defending its turf as 
coequal interpreter of the Constitution and in thinking through the 
consequences of Supreme Court decisions. As a result, legislative 
drafting-as was true during the early New Deal-appears to be, at 
best, sloppy and, at worst, a direct invitation to tl!e Court to strike 
down Congress's enactments. 
In making this point, this section offers some anecdotal evidence 
about Congress-Court relations. My aim is not so much to offer de-
finitive proof; instead, it is to detail why-based on my observations 
over the past several years-! have come to think that Congress has 
played a significant role in the ongoing imbroglio over the scope of its 
powers. 
A. Congress and Constitutional Interpretation 
Congress is increasingly abdicating its core powers, including its 
power to interpret the Constitution independently.29 Sometimes, 
will detail in this Essay, the pace of legislative disinterest in the Court and the Constitution has 
played an instrumental role, but only in changing the attitudes of Supreme Court Justices al-
ready predisposed to disapprove of congressional intrusions into state functions. Here, Con-
gress's apparent disinterest in the Court and the Constitution is emboldening; it makes these 
Justices feel increasingly certain that now is the time to slap Congress down (especially because 
of the growing distrust of Congress). 
28. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 (1997) (criticizing Congress for failing to 
hold legislative hearings or consider less restrictive alternatives); City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 
U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (invoking Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 {1803), and con-
demning Congress for seeking to statutorily overturn a Court interpretation of the Constitu-
tion); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (emphasizing Congress's failure to hold bearings or make findings 
concerning the impact of gun possession on interstate commerce). 
29. On the question of congressional abdication of power, see generally LOUIS FISHER, 
CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR & SPENDING (2000) [hereinafter FISHER, CON· 
GRESSIONAL ABDICATION] (assessing the implications of the shifting balance of power in the 
federal government as Congress abdicated its role in the areas of war and spending powers); 
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WllHOl.IT REsPONSIDII.In': HOW CONGRESS ABUSES ntE 
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 3-21 (1993) (suggesting that congressional delegation o( 
power, beginning in the 1930s, short-circuits the democratic election process). On the question 
of Congress's role in interpreting the Constitution, see LOUIS FISHER, CONS1TIUT10NAL 
DIALOGUES: lNTERPREfATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 233-47 {1998) (hereinafter FISHER, 
CONS1TIUT10NAL DIALOGUES] (arguing that the judiciary should not be the sole interpreter O( 
the Constitution, but, rather, that the three branches must coordinate efforts to fuse law and 
politics in fostering a constitutional dialogue, from which a more comprehensive interpretation 
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Congress treats the Constitution as the exclusive province of the Su-
preme Court; on other occasions, Congress simply seems indifferent 
to the constitutionality of its enactments, including whether the Su-
preme Court is likely to approve or disapprove of its decisionmaking. 
In so doing, Congress signals the Court that it has little institutional 
stake in constitutional matters and, accordingly, that there is little, if 
any, institutional price the Court will pay when invalidating federal 
legislation. With little reason to think about how its decisions will play 
on Capitol Hill,30 the Rehnquist Court's willingness to strike down 
federal legislation of which it disapproves is anything but surprising. 
One manifestation of this phenomenon is the growing use of 
"expedited Supreme Court review" provisions in cases for which 
Congress finds its handiwork constitutionally suspect. Specifically, 
rather than sorting out the constitutionality of the legislation it is con-
sidering, Congress sometimes enacts a fast-track provision enabling 
litigants both to bypass the federal courts of appeal and to secure 
automatic Supreme Court review.31 Over the past several years, Con-
gress has included expedited review provisions on several high-profile 
enactments, including flag burning legislation,32 the Gramm-Rudman 
Act,33 the Communications Decency Act,34 the Line Item Veto Act,3' 
will emerge); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 194 
(1999) (arguing for a method of constitutional interpretation that takes into account the populist 
views of the general public). 
30. See Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE LJ. 511, 529 (1998) (reasoning 
that the Justices rarely consider the possibility of a legislative override); Jeffrey A. Segal, Sepa· 
ration-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. ScJ. REV. 
28, 31-32 (1997) (arguing that the high cost of congressional reversal and the many vetoes pre· 
eluding such a reversal account for the Court's lack of concern for possible legislative over· 
rides). 
31. The precise terms of these expedited review provisions vary greatly, but most mandate 
Supreme Court review. See, e.g., Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 3, 110 Stat. 1200, 
1211 (1996), invalidated in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (mandating Su· 
preme Court review after trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia). 
Moreover, while the federal courts of appeal are almost always bypassed, it is sometimes the 
case that a three-judge district court panel will hear the initial challenge. Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Aet of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274(a)(5), 99 Stat.1038, 1098. 
32. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, § 3, 103 Stat. 777, 777, invalidated in 
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1998). 
33. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 
§ 274(a)(5), 99 Stat. 1038, 1098. 
34. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561, 110 Stat. 133, 14Z.. 
43,partially invalidated in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
35. Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 3, 110 Stat. 1200, 1211 (1996), invalidated in Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). , 
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and census reform legislation.36 In all these statutes, the expedited re-
view provision was not part of the original bill; instead, after constitu-
tional objections were raised, Congress-rather than settle the issue 
itself-decided that it was best to hand the matter off to the Supreme 
Court.37 
The Line Item Veto Act exemplifies how expedited review pro-
visions, in effect, delegate Congress's power to interpret the Constitu-
tion to the Supreme Court.38 Although Senator Robert Byrd spoke of 
the oath that each member takes to "support and defend the Consti-
tution," and, with it, Congress's responsibility to "be resolving those 
[constitutional] questions on [its] own,"39 nearly all members were 
quite happy to leave the Act's constitutional fate solely in the hands 
of the Supreme Court. For example, Representative William Clinger, 
chairman of the House committee with jurisdiction over the bill, an-
swered objections "that [the bill] is unconstitutional" by declaring: "It 
is not really our job to determine what is constitutional or what is not 
unconstitutional."40 Equally striking, Senator Paul Simon, a cosponsor 
of the bill, explained the provision requiring expedited Supreme 
Court review this way: "What we do not want is to live in limbo .... 
36. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of1998, Pub. L No. 105-119, § 209, 111 StaL 2240,2482 (1997). 
37. Consider, for example, census legislation enacted in 1997, supra note 36. Democrats 
and Republicans divided over the constitutionality of using statistical sampling to compensate 
for the historical undercounting of minorities. Compare 143 CONG. REc. H8222 (daily ed. Sept. 
30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hastert (R-IL)) (arguing that statistical sampling is unconstitu-
tional), with id. at H8228 (statement of Rep. Watt (D-NC)) (arguing that statistical sampling is 
constitutional). To break this logjam, lawmakers included an expedited review provision "if the 
Census Bureau attempts to spend money on sampling in the 2000 Census." Jerry Gray, In 
Spending Bill, A Gaundet on Census is Thrown Down, N.Y. TIMES, OcL 23,1997, at A23. 
38. Before enacting the Line Item Veto Act, Congress held numerous hearings (over a 
number of years) concerning the constitutionality of a line-item veto. See FISHER, 
CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION, supra note 29, at 137-53 (detailing the legislative history of the 
Line Item Veto Act). On other occasions, however, Congress has added an expedited review 
provision to a measure without considering the pertinent constitutional issues in a meaningful 
way. See infra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the expedited review procedures in 
the Gramm-Rudman Act). 
39. 142 CONG. REc. 6509 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd (D-WV)). 
40. I d. at 6912 (statement of Rep. Clinger (R-PA)). Indeed, to faciHtate fast-track judicial 
review, Congress added a provision to the bill allowing lawmakers to challenge the statute even 
before President Clinton employed the line-item veto. In Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), 
however, the Supreme Court concluded that lawmakers lacked standing to bring the case. /d. at 
830. 
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[As to the legislation's constitutionality,] I do not know who is right. 
The courts have to make that determination."41 
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court struck down the Line Item 
Veto Act.42 The Justices almost always invalidate congressional stat-
utes that contain expedited review provisions.43 And why not? Con-
gress cannot possibly object to such Court decisions, for the expedited 
review provision makes clear that Congress sees itself as subordinate 
to the Court and, consequently, has little stake in the constitutional 
fate of its handiwork.44 
There are other ways that Congress signals the Court that consti-
tutional questions are the Court's domain. When deliberating about 
the Constitution's meaning, Congress often treats the Court's deci-
sions as definitive and final. In other words, unlike Court-curbing pe-
riods (during which Congress has sought to limit the reach of Court 
decisions on, among other things, abortion, busing, and school 
41. 141 CONG. REc. 8417 (1995) (statement of Sen. Simon (D-IL)). When Congress en-
acted an expedited review provision in the Gmmm-Rudman Act, similar concerns were ex-
pressed. House Judiciary Chair Pete Rodino noted that "the constitutional problems with this 
measure" have not been resolved and "(t]hat is why the inclusion of a provision ••• calling for 
quick judicial review is absolutely essential." 131 CONG. REC. 30,158 (1985) (statement of Rep. 
Rodino (D-NJ)). Along the same lines, Representative Jack Brooks remarked: "There is hardly 
anybody who can say with a straight face that Gramm-Rudman or any version of it is free of 
serious constitutional questions. It is vital that we have a mechanism in place to ensure that 
those questions get to court and be addressed directly." /d. at 30,150 (statement of Rep. Brooks 
(D-TX)); see also infra note 62 (discussing the expedited review provision in the Communica-
tions Decency Act). 
42. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,421 (1998). I do not mean to suggest, how· 
ever, that the Court's decision was a good one. See Neal Devins, Congressional Faclfinding and 
the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1188-93 (2001) (de· 
fending the constitutionality of line-item veto legislation). 
43. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (invalidating portions of the Com· 
munications Decency Act); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (invalidating flag 
protection legislation); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (holding that section 251 of 
tlte Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act violates the Constitution by permit· 
ting Congress to participate in the execution of its own laws). And when the Justices have not 
declared statutes unconstitutional, they still have been able to frustrate congressional objectives 
through statutory interpretation. See Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Reprcsenta· 
tives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 (1999) (rejecting the planned use of statistical sampling during the 2000 
census as inconsistent with the Census Act). 
44. For a related argument, see Mark Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislat,-vl! 
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEY. 35, 37-68 (1993) (arguing that lawmakers 
occasionally leave it to the courts to address contentious political issues the lawmakers could not 
adequately resolve). 
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prayer),45 the modem Congress hardly ever casts doubt on either the 
correctness of the Court's rulings or, more fundamentally, the Court's 
power to interpret the Constitution authoritatively.46 
Consider, for example, Congress's response to Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena,41 a 1995 Supreme Court decision declaring that 
federal affirmative action programs must satisfy the Court's strictest 
standard of judicial review.48 In the immediate wake of the Court's 
decision, Senator Phil Gramm proposed eliminating set-asides for 
minorities and women in federal contracting. Gramm explained, "my 
amendment is written in total conformity with Adarand .... That is, if 
the court finds that a contractor was [personally] subject to discrimi-
nation, the court may provide a remedy with a set-aside ... .'tt'l In 
sharp contrast, Senator Arlen Specter called attention to Adarand's 
recognition that the government may act in response to "both the 
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination. ,,50 Along 
these lines, Senator Patty Murray countered Gramm's efforts by pro-
posing that federal funds can be used only for "programs . . . com-
pletely consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in ... 
Adarand."51 In the end, the Murray amendment was approved by a 
45. See EDWARD KEYNES wrm RANDALL K. MILLER, 1HE COURT VS. CONGRESS: 
PRAYER, BUSING, AND ABORTION (1989) (providing a general treatment of Congress's power 
to curb the Court in certain areas). 
46. For a historical overview of Court-curbing, see FISHER, CONSTJTUTJONAL 
DIALOGUES, supra note 29, at 200-30. In arguing that today's Congress is accepting of the 
Court's "ultimate authority," I do not mean to suggest that members of Congress never express 
disappointment with the Court or, alternatively, that Congress never acts in response to Court 
decisions. My point, instead, is that Congress-notwithstanding the Court's increasing v.illing-
ness to strike down federal legislation-is far more accepting of the Court today than it has been 
in the past. See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's response to the 
recent wave of anti-Congress Relmquist Court decisions). 
47. 515 u.s. 200 (1995). 
48. I d. at 237-38. While the Court remanded the case to the lower courts {and thereby did 
not rule on the constitutionality of a highway set-aside program), Adarand is the first case in 
which the Court refused to uphold a congressionally approved affirmative action plan. On the 
question of whether federal affirmative action legislation is poorly crafted, sec Devins, s11pra 
note 42, at 1200-06 (highlighting Congress's disinterest in building a factual record supporting 
affirmative action legislation). 
49. 141 CONG. REc.19,670 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gramm (R-TX)). 
50. Id. at 19,671 (statement of Sen. Specter (R-PA)) (quoting Justice O'Connor's opinion 
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995)). 
51. Id. at 19,667 (statement of Sen. Murray (D-WA)). 
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lopsided 84-13 vote, and the Gramm amendment was soundly de-
feated by a bipartisan 61-36 vote.52 
Two things stand out from this nonresponse to Adarand. First, 
everyone agreed that Adarand was the law of the land. Gramm did 
not build his case around the wrongness, as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, of the government's decision to sometimes take race 
into account;53 Murray did not argue that Adarand was wrong in em-
bracing strict review and, consequently, that Congress should defend 
existing affirmative action programs (and leave it for the Court, not 
Congress, to implement the Justices' understanding of things). Sec-
ond, in sorting out what to do, the Senate thought it better to return 
this issue to the courts than to interpret Adarand independently. In 
particular, the Gramm amendment required the Senate to embrace a 
particular understanding of Adarand. The Murray amendment, in 
contrast, was so open-ended that it would not require Congress inde-
pendently to adopt a particular understanding of Adarand. As a con-
sequence, litigants challenging the program could seek a definitive 
answer as to what Adarand means by going to a higher authority than 
Congress, namely, the federal courts. 
It is little wonder that Supreme Court Justices feel empowered 
by such legislative deliberations. By seeing the Constitution as the 
Supreme Court's domain, Congress encourages the Court to strike 
down measures the Justices dislike, to settle presidential elections, 
and so forth.54 And while the Justices may not know about the 
52 Kevin Merida, Senate Rejects Gramm Bid to Bar Affirmative Action Set-Asides, WASH. 
POST, July 21, 1995, at A13. More recently, in September 1997, then-Senator John Ashcroft 
sponsored hearings intended to demonstrate that federally funded set-asides were inconsistent 
with Adarand. Robert G. Kaiser & Walter Pincus, Chief Foe as Chief Defender?: Ashcroft Critl· 
cal of Laws, Decisions He Would Enforce, WASH. POST, Jan.13, 2001, at Al. But, as it did with 
the Gramm proposal, the Senate left the matter alone, preferring to steer clear of the affirma· 
tive action wars rather than engage in a partisan fight over the propriety of preferences. 
53. Gramm did argue, however, that affirmative action was bad public policy. See 141 
CONG. REC. 19,670 {1995) (statement of Sen. Gramm (R-TX)) (arguing that "inequity" cannot 
be corrected by "making inequity the law of the land"). 
54. By deciding Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 {2000), the Supreme Court signaled that it, not 
Congress, was best positioned to settle the presidential election. Whether or not the Court 
doubted "the capacity of Congress to carry the burden of political leadership in conditions of 
constitutional stress," Frank I. Michelman, S11spicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
679,688-89 {2001), there is little question that the Court thought it could decide the issue with· 
out destroying its institutional legitimacy. In this way, Bush v. Gore is very much like the Wa-
tergate tapes case, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 {1974). In believing that "they could as· 
sure the legitimacy of the process and the legitimacy of the winner of the presidency," the 
members of the Court reached out to decide a fundamental question that, in critical respects, 
the Constitution delegated to the Congress. Gerald Gunther, A Risky Moment for tlte Court, 
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Gramm-Murray exchange, they certainly know that a legislative 
backlash has not followed in the wake of recent rulings limiting con-
gressional power. There is no talk of packing the Court, of stripping it 
of jurisdiction,55 or of amending the Constitution in response to these 
rulings. Moreover, these decisions played n.o role in the 2000 elec-
tions.56 Finally, Congress has shown relatively little interest in rewrit-
ing these statutes.57 And when Congress has revisited its handiwork, 
lawmakers have paid close attention to the Supreme Court's rulings, 
limiting their efforts to revisions the Court is likely to approve.~ 
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 2000, at A37; see also Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegmrony and Legislative 
Alllonomy, 22 UCLA L REv. 30,33 {1974) (criticizing the Court for thinking that it has a "spe-
cial obligation to save the nation in episodes of constitutional crisis"); Jeffrey Rosen, Tire Re-
count Is In, and the Supreme Court Loses, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,2001, at A23 ("The dispute over 
the recount was political, not legal, and should have been resolved by Congress rather than by 
the courts."). 
55. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text {describing how Congress is actually in-
creasing the workload of the federal judiciary, much to the Court's dismay). 
56. For an explanation, published before the election, as to why this is so, see Taylor, supra 
note 1, at 1818-19 (examining why voters "have far more confidence in the Supreme Court than 
in Congress •.. [and] the executive branch"). 
57. In sharp contrast, following the Court's invalidation of early New Deal legislation, the 
New Deal Congress reworked several statutes. Cushman, Tire Hug/res Court, supra note 8, at 
81-97. 
58. Of the twenty-three statutes struck down by the Court between 1995 and 2000, Con-
gress revised four of them. First, in 1996, Congress responded to United States v. Lopez;, 514 
U.S. 549 {1995), a Supreme Court decision invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. 
lei. at 567. Under the new statute, the federal government must prove that the firearm has 
"moved in or otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2){A) 
{Supp. V 1999); see Guns in Sdrools: A Federal Role?: Hearing Before tire Subcomm. on Youtlr 
Violence of the S. Comm. otztlre Judiciary, 104th Con g. 9 {1995) {statement of Walter Dellinger, 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel) (explaining how the statute conforms to 
Lopez). Second, in 1998, following the Court's repudiation of portions of the Communications 
Decency Act {CDA) in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997), Congress enacted the Chil-
dren's Online Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (Supp. V 1999). "[A]ddress[ing] the spe-
cific concerns raised by the Supreme Court," the Act responds to several of the Court's criti-
cisms of the CDA, including the lack of legislative hearings, the failure to consider less 
restrictive alternatives, and the overbroad definition of what constitutes indecency. H.R. REP. 
No. 105-775, at 12 {1998). Third, in 2000, Congress responded to City of Boerne ''· Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997), a Supreme Court decision invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) as an improper exercise of Congress's powers under Section 5 o[ the Fourteenth 
Amendment. I d. at 536. The new statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act of2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (Supp. V 1999), narrows the scope of RFRA protec-
tions to categories Congress thinks satisfy the Boerne standard or make use of its spending and 
co=erce powers. See 146 CONG. REC. Sm4-75 {daily ed. July 27, 2000) {remarks of Sen. 
Hatch (R-UT)) (detailing sources of constitutional authority for the statute and, in so doing, 
explaining why the statute conforms to Boerne). Fourth, also in 2000, Congress enacted the 
Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491. This statute, how-
ever, is concerned principally with federal funding directed at the prevention of domestic vio-
HeinOnline -- 51 Duke L.J. 448 2001-2002
448 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:435 
B. Congress and the Drafting of Constitutional Legislation 
That Congress sometimes equates Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing with the Constitution speaks more of legislators' interest in 
achieving desired political outcomes than anything else. Opponents of 
legislation, when raising constitutional objections, are on firmer 
footing when they suggest that the federal courts will strike down a 
measure. And, as was true with Phil Gramm's effort to undo set-
asides, proponents of initiatives likewise seek to bolster their case by 
claiming that they are simply effectuating the decisions of the Su-
preme Court. Moreover, by embracing expedited review provisions 
(that short-circuit fights over a measure's constitutionality), bill sup-
porters help to secure passage of a favored measure. Finally, when re-
crafting legislation in accordance with a Supreme Court decision, 
Congress often is motivated by the interests of the constituencies that 
supported the legislation in the first place. 
Just as talk of the Court's status as ultimate intetpreter of the 
Constitution may be a rhetorical device used to pursue political ends, 
it is to be expected that Congress sometimes ignores the Court in or-
der to pursue a political end. For this reason, I think it especially use-
ful to examine some recent occasions in which Congress seemed, at 
best, indifferent to the Court. Before turning to these examples, a few 
words on why the recent spate of anti-Congress Rehnquist Court 
rulings is, in part, a by-product of such legislative indifference. Spe-
cifically, just as talk of judicial supremacy encourages the Court to see 
itself as supreme and, consequently, to place more and more con-
straints on Congress, legislative indifference to Court rulings creates 
more and more occasions in which Congress will run afoul of those 
ever-increasing constraints. And if Congress fails to challenge the 
Court by asserting its independent voice in interpreting the Constitu-
lence. H.R. REP. No. 106-891, at 24 {2000). No effort was made to revive the right-to-sue provi-
sion struck down in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress 
did not have the power, either under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to provide all victims of gender-motivated crime with a federal civil remedy). 
Congress, moreover, embraced Department of Transportation efforts to modify its 
regulatory scheme in response to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Not• 
ing that "the Department has proposed a number of regulations intended to address the 'narrow 
tailoring' requirements of 'strict scrutiny,"' H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-550, at 410-11 {1998), re• 
printed in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 70, 82-83, Congress, in 1998, reauthorized the disadvantaged busi· 
ness enterprise program that was the subject of the Adarand litigation. Transportation Equity 
Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No.105-178, 112 Stat.107 {1998). 
HeinOnline -- 51 Duke L.J. 449 2001-2002
2001] CONGRESS AS CULPRIT 449 
tion, the Court is apt to grow less and less tolerant of such congres-
sional lapses and create even more constraining doctrine. 
Two recent examples of Congress giving short shrift to both the 
Constitution and the Supreme Court stand out: the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA)59 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA).60 When enacting the CDA (introduced on the Senate floor 
as an amendment to a massive telecommunications bill), Congress ig-
nored Clinton administration warnings to hold hearings on the bill's 
constitutionality.61 Rather, as Senator Patrick Leahy described: "[We] 
went willy-nilly, pass[ing] legislation, and never once ... [having] a 
discussion other than an hour or so on the floor.',& The result was a 
bill that "[n]o one, not even its defenders, claims ... was drafted ele-
gantly or even consistently."63 A unanimous Supreme Court agreed, 
noting the lack of hearings, inconsistencies in the bill's use of the term 
"indecent," and Congress's failure to consider less burdensome alter-
natives.64 
RFRA is an even more outrageous example of Congress's indif-
ference to bow its legislation would fare before the Supreme Court.65 
Here, Congress, in response to a restrictive Supreme Court interpre-
tation of Free Exercise Clause protections, attempted to justify its ac-
tions as a permissible exercise of its enforcement powers under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 66 But Congress ignored the 
59. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133, partially in· 
validated in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
60. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), invalidated i11 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
u.s. 507 (1997). 
61. See John Schwartz, On-Line Obscenity Bill Gains i11 Se110te, Panel Backs Legislation. 
Critics See Threat to First Amendment, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1995, at A1 (quoting White House 
spokeswoman Ginny Terzano's call for a "serious approach-such as hearings-to find the best 
solution"). 
62. Cyberpom and Children: The Scope of the Problem, Tile State of the Technology, and 
the Need for Congressional Action: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 
7 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy (D-VT)). Perhaps for this reason, an expedited review provi-
sion was added to the CDA See 142 CONG. REC 2662 {1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting 
that "such serious questions about the constitutionality of this legislation have been raised that a 
new section was added to speed up judicial review to see if the legislation would pass constitu· 
tiona! muster"). 
63. Peter D. Kennedy, The Supreme Co11rt and Cyberspace: Pending Cl~allenges to the 
Communicatums Decency Act, COMM. L., Fall1996, at 3, 3. 
64. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 858. 
65. For a detailed treatment of this subject (from which this paragraph draws), see gener-
ally Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge the Co11rt, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645 {1998). 
66. 'In this way, Congress could have expressed its (quite justified) disapproval of the Su-
preme Court's religious liberty decisionmaking without demanding that the Court overrule it-
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advice of law professors who testified that it should make specific 
findings of fact "that formally neutral, generally applicable laws have 
historically been instruments of religious persecution, that enacting 
separate religious liberty exemptions in every statute is not a work-
able means of protecting religious liberty, and that litigation about 
governmental motives is not a workable means of protecting religious 
liberty."67 Instead, Congress condemned the Court for its "disas-
trous,"68 "dastardly and unprovoked,"69 and "devastating"70 "degrada-
tion,"71 if not "virtual[] eliminat[ion,]"72 of religious liberty protec-
tions. And while RFRA's interest-group sponsors may have 
welcomed such vitriol, the Supreme Court, in City of Boerne v Flo-
res,73 rebuffed Congress for seeking to statutorily overturn a Court in-
terpretation of the Constitution.74 More fundamentally, the Court ex-
pressed skepticism of Congress by embracing a standard of review 
that has further curtailed Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers.75 
self. And because the Court (in a decision issued in the midst of legislative consideration of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act) had made clear that "to overrule under (political) fire , , , 
would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question," lawmakers should have 
acted judiciously when seeking to chasten the Court for its restrictive reading of First Amend· 
ment religious liberty protections. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). In· 
stead, lawmakers acted with reckless abandon. See Devins, supra note 42, at 1196, 1197 (arguing 
that Congress gave "short shrift to factfinding" when enacting RFRA). 
67. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 011 Civil am/ 
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 331 (1992) (testimony of Pro• 
fessor Douglas Laycock); see also id. at 390-91 (testimony of Professor Ira C. Lupu) (calling at· 
tention to the need for Congress to show that RFRA is grounded in "legislative superiority in 
fact-finding" and not Congress's disapproval with the "direction and result" of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking). 
68. 139 CONG. REc. 9683 (1993) (statement of Rep. Nadler (D·NY)). 
69. 137 CONG. REC.17,035-36 (1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz (D-NY)). 
70. 139 CONG. REc. 9684 (1993) (statement of Rep. Schumer (D-NY)). 
71. 1d. at 9685 (statement of Rep. Orton (D-UT)). 
72 1d. at 9683 (statement of Rep. Nadler (D-NY)). 
73. 521 u.s. 507 (1997). 
74. 1d. at 535-36. While no Justice took issue with the Court's conclusion that Congress 
had overstepped its bounds, three Justices would have reconsidered the Court's restrictive ap· 
proach toward religious liberty clailns.1d. at 544-66 (Souter, Breyer, O'Connor, JJ., dissenting), 
75. Since its decision in Boerne, the Court has invalidated three other federal statutes as 
ilnpermissible exercises of Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers. See Bd. of Trs. of the 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967-68, (2001) (partially invalidating the 
Americans with Disabilities Act on the ground that it conflicts with the Eleventh Amendment); 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding Congress's abrogation of states' 
sovereign immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to be unconstitutional); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 521 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (invalidating 
the Patent Remedy Act as an unconstitutional abrogation of state immunity that cannot be justi· 
fied by Congress's Section 5 enforcement power). 
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Congress, however, has not paid much mind to this tightening of 
its Section 5 powers. A search of the Congressional Record reveals 
that members of Congress have mentioned the precedential value of 
Boerne on only nine occasions.76 Congress's apparent disinterest in 
Boerne is the rule, not the exception, when it comes to recent Court 
decisions limiting congressional prerogatives. United States v. Lopez,77 
the case that invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, also has re-
ceived scant attention in congressional debates. Notwithstanding the 
fact that Lopez was the first case in more than sixty years to declare a 
federal statute outside Congress's Commerce Clause power (and that 
it has since proven an instrumental precedent in invalidating the 
Violence Against Women Act)78, members of Congress have men-
tioned the case's precedential value only sixteen times since 1995, the 
year Lopez was decided.79 Finally, the Court's anticommandeering 
cases, Printz v. United Statesro and New York v. United States,81 have 
not figured into congressional deliberations. The precedential value 
76. See LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combinecl, from June 
25, 1997 (the date of the Boeme decision) to July 24, 2001; see, e.g., 146 CONG. REc. E1235 
(daily eel. July 14, 2000} (remarks of Rep. Canady (R-FL)) (defending the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act as a protection of free exercise not subject to the challenges 
raised in Boeme); 146 CoNG. REC. S3973 {daily eel. May 16, 2000} (statement of Sen. Biden (O-
DE)) (citing Boeme as testament to the Court's willingness to second-guess Congress's legisla-
tive judgment and assert itself as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution). On nine 
other occasions, Boerne was mentioned-six times in connection \\ith the scheduling of hearings 
and three times in connection with the inclusion of letters and memos into the Record. Boeme 
also was mentioned six times in connection with efforts to revamp tlte Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act 
77. 514 u.s. 549 (1995}. 
78. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,619 (2000} (concluding tltat the Commerce 
Oause did not give Congress the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act). 
79. See LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combinetl, from April 
26, 1995 (the date of the Lopez decision} to July 24, 2001; see, e.g., 146 CONG. REc. H7533 
(daily eel. Sept 13, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson (D-AR}} (characterizing the Lopez 
decision as a warning that congressional power nnder the Commerce Oause is subject to outer 
limits); 146 CoNG. REc. sn75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) Ooint statement of Sen. Hatch (R-UT) 
and Sen. Kennedy (D-MA)} (noting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence 
Against Women Act were struck down because they regulated noneconomic activity). In 1995, 
Lopez's precedential value was mentioned ten times by members of Congress. On nine other 
occasions, the case was mentioned in connection \vith letters and memoranda entered into the 
Congressional Record. Lopez also was mentioned five times in connection "ith efforts to re-
vamp the Jaws regarding guns in schools. 
80. 521 u.s. 898 (1997}. 
81. 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
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of New York has been mentioned by members of Congress six times;82 
the precedential value of Printz has been mentioned twice.83 
While these measures are somewhat artificial, they are nonethe-
less telling. At a minimum, they suggest that Congress is not paying 
much attention to the signals the Court is sending it. Correspondingly, 
Congress seems more and more willing to jeopardize its legislative 
work through sloppy drafting.84 On federalism-related issues, for ex-
ample, the federal laws struck down "were quite poorly or negligently 
drafted."85 In Lopez, Congress failed to engage in factfinding, make a 
jurisdictional statement, or otherwise consider the constitutionality of 
its handiwork.86 In the Violence Against Women Act, Congress did 
assemble a "mountain of data . . . showing the effects of violence 
against women on interstate commerce."87 At the same time, by 
82 See LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, from June 
19, 1992 (the date of the New York decision) to July 24, 2001; see, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S3909 
(daily ed. Apr. 20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Lott (R-MS)) (asserting that his changes to the Na-
tional Salvage Motor Vehicle Consumer Protection Act were consistent with the decision in 
New York v. United States); 144 CONG. REC. S5100 (daily ed. May 19, 1998) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch (R-UT)) (arguing that decisions like New York and Printz have made the Tenth 
Amendment a shield against federal imposition on the sovereign authority of the states). 
83. See LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, from June 
27, 1997 (the date of the Printz decision) to July 24, 2001; see, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S7777 (daily 
ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch (R-UT) and Sen. Kennedy (D·MA)) (arguing 
that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act complies with Printz because it 
does not "compel the states to enact or enforce a regulatory program"). On several other occa· 
sions, however, members of Congress have introduced letters, memoranda, and resolutions that 
mention these cases-thirteen times for New York and three times for Printz. See Matthew D. 
Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 
SUP. Cr. REV. 71, 138 (discussing the paucity of references to New York and Printz). 
84. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text (discussing how poor legislative drafting 
helped doom the Communications Decency Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and 
other high-profile enactments). 
85. Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Regulation in a Post-Lopez World: Soml! 
Questions and Answers, 30 ENVIL. L. REP. 10980, 10989 (2000). Several of the examples that 
follow are drawn from Professor Gerhardt's article. 
86. See Devins, supra note 42, at 1194. The fact that the Supreme Court had not signaled 
(through pre-Lopez decisionmaking) that such factfinding might be relevant to its assessment of 
the statute does not excuse Congress's sloppiness. In critical respects, Lopez responded to Con· 
gress's increasingly cavalier attitude toward the scope of its Commerce Clause powers. In par· 
ticular, Congress federalized all sorts of things without engaging in factfinding or contemplating 
the ways in which such federalization expanded the workload of federal judges. See infra notes 
106-10 and accompanying text (discussing how federalization affected the federal judiciary). 
And while a Supreme Court with different values would not have interceded, the Court's action 
in Lopez-notwithstanding the lack of prior notice-can be understood as a response to Con• 
gress's negligence. 
87. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-29 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). Con· 
gress assembled this data to respond to complaints that the statute had little to do with com· 
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grounding the statute in both Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Commerce Clause, Congress disregarded the well-
settled rule that it could not use its Section 5 power to regulate pri-
vate conduct.88 And in several cases restricting Congress's Section 5 
powers, Congress's factfinding was too limited or nonexistent.IJ') In 
particular, Congress failed to convince the Court that it was re-
sponding to a nationwide problem involving both state and private ac-
tors.90 For these very reasons, the Court, while invalidating scores of 
federal laws, has had to overturn only three of its precedents.91 
Making matters worse, Congress had every reason to expect that 
the Court would make it pay a price for its sloppiness. For example, 
in both the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against 
Women Act, Congress enacted legislation federalizing crime over 
objections by both the Judicial Conference and Chief Justice 
Relmquist.92 More to the point, since most states bar gun possession 
merce. See infra note 92 and accompanying text (noting objections to the statute voiced by both 
the Judicial Confereuce and Chief Justice William Rehnquist). The majority, while not disputing 
this assertion, concluded that violence against women was "noneconomic." Morrison, 529 U.S. 
at613. 
88. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-24. 
89. For example, when enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress failed 
to make the types of findings needed to show that a national solution was necessary. See supra 
note 67 and accompanying text 
90. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (discussing RFRA); see also Bd. ofTrs. 
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,121 S. Ct. 955,965-66 (2001) (discussing congrcs-
sioual failure to establish the historical basis of state discrimination against the disabled); Kimel 
v. Fla. Bel. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) ("Congress never identified any pattern of age dis-
crimination by States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitu-
tioual violation."); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (observing that Congress did not identify a "pattern of patent infringement 
by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations"). 
91. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. E.~pense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
680 (rejecting the constructive waiver doctrine of Parden v. Temrinal Railll'ay of tlte Alabama 
Docks Department, 317 U.S. 184 (1964)); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (19%) (re-
jecting Congress's power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment via a statute enacted under the 
Commerce Clause, overturning Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that federal afflillllltive action pro-
grams are subject to strict scrutiny review, not intermediate scrutiny review, overturning Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)). 
92. Rehnquist, in 1992, wrote that Congress ought to "avoid adding new federal causes of 
action unless critical to meeting important national interests that cannot otherv.ise be satisfied 
through non-judicial forums, alternative dispute resolution techniques or the state courts." Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, Congress Is Crippling Federal Courts, Ever-E:cpancling Number of 'Federal' 
Crimes; Belong in State Courts Instead, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 1992, at 3B. The 
Judicial Conference also expressed opposition to both the federalization of crime and the Line 
Item Veto Act, arguing that it would threaten judicial independence by expanding the presi-
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in school and every state provides civil remedies for gender-related 
violence,93 the Court may well have seen these attempts to expand the 
scope of federal power as little more than Congress pandering to 
popular sentiment. 
No doubt, a Court with different values may have welcomed-as 
Senator Joseph Biden put it-Congress's federalizing "'everything 
that walks, talks, and moves."'94 The Rehnquist Court, however, is not 
that Court. Rather than look the other way, it seized upon Congress's 
sloppiness.95 Put another way, Congress had significant control over 
its fate. Had Congress acted more cautiously, the Rehnquist Court 
may have deferred the return of the "Constitution in Exile."96 
C. Congress and the Management of the Federal Judiciary 
Congress has jeopardized its relationship with the Supreme 
Court further through its handling of several matters affecting the 
day-to-day lives of federal judges, including judicial salaries, the pace 
of judicial confirmations, and a range of issues affecting federal 
judges' workloads. And while some of these matters have no direct 
relationship to Court decisionmaking on federalism-related issues, it 
is nevertheless true that the attitudes of federal judges, including Su-
dent's power over judicial salaries. See id. (discussing federalization of crime); Jan Crawford 
Greenburg, Judges Back on Political Hot Seat, Controversial Ruling Sparks Criticism, CHI. 
TR!B., Apr. 3, 1996, at 1 {discussing line-item veto legislation). After Congress (responding to 
Judicial Conference objections) revamped the Violence Against Women Act, the Judicial Con· 
ference took no position on the legislation. For an account of this episode, see Judith Resnik, 
The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating tlte Violence Against Women 
Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 270-274 {2000). 
93. See Steve France, Laying the GroundiVork, 86 A.B.A. J. 40, 42 {2000) (characterizing 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Violence 
Against Women Act as "busybody legislation"). 
94. Dan Freedman, FBI Criticizes Trend ToiVards "Federalizing," Agents Don't Want to Be 
Street Cops, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1993, at A2 (quoting Sen. Bid en (D-DE)). 
95. Professor Keith Whittington, in his response to Professor Schroeder's paper, puts it this 
way: "The federalism offensive can best be understood as a product of the Court's taking advan· 
tage of a relatively favorable political environment to advance a constitutional agenda of par· 
ticular concern to some individuals within the Court's conservative majority." Keith E. Whit· 
tington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 
477, 479 {2001). 
96. The fact that the Rehnquist Court often divides 5-4 on federalism-related issues bol· 
sters this claim. Specifically, if any member of the Rehnquist Court majority had been influ. 
enced by Congress's cavalier approach to federalism-related issues, the Court would have 
lacked the majority it needed to push through its federalism counterrevolution. See infra note 
128 (collecting sources that suggest that Congress still retains the power to pursue initiatives 
that the Relmquist Court has invalidated on federalism-related grounds). 
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preme Court Justices, toward Congress are affected by Congress's 
management of issues related to the judiciary. In other words, a Court 
that has doubts about Congress's trustworthiness will find it easier to 
constrain Congress than will a Court that has a high regard for Con-
gress.97 
Over the past five years, Chief Justice Rehnquist has used his 
year-end report on the federal judiciary to encourage Congress to live 
up to its responsibility "to enable the judges to do a better job of ad-
ministering justice."98 Consider, for example, judicial salaries. In 1996, 
Rehnquist complained that Congress's failure to pay judges a com-
petitive salary "cannot be overstated in tenns of its effects on the mo-
rale and quality of the federal judiciary."99 Four years later, in sup-
porting the repeal of a congressional ban on honoraria, Rehnquist 
pointed to the fact that "'a first-year associate in a law firm could 
make as much in salary as a federal judge,"' and again argued that 
Congress was undermining "'the ability of the judiciary to retain and 
recruit the most capable lawyers."'100 Making matters worse, Con-
gress-from 1997 to 1999-refused to make cost-of-living adjustments 
to judicial salaries.101 And while Congress's action may be more are-
sult of the politics surrounding congressional pay than anything else, 
lawmaker insensitivity to judicial salaries nevertheless harmed Con-
gress-Court relations.102 
Far more damaging to Congress-Court relations, however, is a 
constellation of interconnected issues involving both the workload of 
federal judges and the types of cases that federal judges hear. First, 
the total number of cases filed in the federal courts of appeals has in-
97. In making this point, I do not mean to suggest that Supreme Court Justices would 
knowingly retaliate against Congress for its poor management of judici~UY·related issues. My 
point, instead, is that there is a correlation between attitudes toward go\·emment and Supreme 
Court decisionmaking. See Schroeder, supro note 4, at 346-51 (discussing the impact of public 
distrust of government on the growing opposition to federalization). 
98. William H. Rehnquist, 1996 Year-End Report on the Ft:dt:ral Judiciary, at http://w\\W. 
uscourts.gov/cj96.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2001) (on file with tbe Duke Law Journal). 
99. Id. 
100. Judges and Honorarfu, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,2000, at A18. 
101. See Underpaid Federal Judges, CHI. TRIB., July 26, 1999, at 10 (noting that a lawsuit by 
federal judges to receive cost-of-living adjustments may have been mooted by a new appropria-
tions bill that permitted such raises). 
102. Judicial salary increases typically are tied to congressional pay. In 1997, however, Con-
gress forgot to include a salary increase for federal judges. Pay F~ez.e Raises Tension Betwt:t:n 
Congress, Federal Judges, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 21, 1997, at 4A. 
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creased more than seventy percent over the past two decades.103 Dur-
ing the same period, federal district courts saw the total number of 
criminal cases increase by fifty percent, with drug cases tripling.104 As 
a result, "[c]ivil cases are often placed on the back burner, in some ju-
risdictions, as the judges try to cope with the flood of drug and gun 
cases."105 
Second, Congress has contributed to this explosion of federal 
litigation by increasingly federalizing matters (especially crime ).106 
More than "40 percent of federal criminal provisions enacted since 
the Civil War have been enacted since 1970."107 Among other things, 
Congress has criminalized many things that the states already outlaw, 
including drug crimes, carjacking, failure to pay child support, embez-
zlement from an insurance company, drive-by shootings, and posses-
sion of a handgun near a school.11~ For their part, the federal courts 
have resisted this increasing federalization. In 1995 and again in 1998, 
the Judicial Conference lobbied Congress to "commit itself to con-
serving the federal courts as a distinctive forum of limited jurisdiction 
in our system of federalism."109 Chief Justice Rehnquist, moreover, 
used his bully pulpit to warn Congress of the costs of federalization-
clogging the courts' dockets, overworking federal judges, changing 
103. Between 1981 and 1991, there was a sixty percent increase. L. RALPH MECHAM, 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF TilE DIRECTOR 81 tbl.1 
(1992). With Congress's continuing commitment to federalization, the number of filings is still 
increasing. By 1996, filings in the federal courts of appeals had risen to an all-time high of 
52,000. See Rehnquist, supra note 98. By 2000, filings increased another four percent to 54,697. 
William H. Rehnquist, 2000 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/ttb/janOlttb (last visited Aug. 21, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
104. MECHAM, supra note 103, at 90 tbl.8. Since that time, criminal filings have continued to 
rise. From 1994 to 2000, criminal filings rose every year. See Rehnquist, supra note 103. In 1998, 
federal courts saw a double-digit increase in criminal filings. William H. Rehnquist, 1998 Year· 
End Report of the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan99ttb/january1999.html 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
105. Letter from J. Clifford Wallace, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir· 
cuit, to William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court; Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney 
General; Joseph Eiden, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee; Jack Brooks, Chair, House Judici• 
ary Committee (Mar. 29, 1993), reprinted in William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical 
Overview, 44 DEPAULL. REV. 719,739 (1995). 
106. See generally William P. Marshall, American Political Culwre and tile Failures of Proc-
ess Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 139, 142-47 (1998) (describing this phenomenon 
and offering an explanation of why Congress federalizes so many areas of legal concern). 
107. John J. Mountjoy, The Federalization of Criminal Laws, SPECTRUM, Summer 1999, at 
1, 1. 
108. This list is taken from Edwin Meese III, Big Brother on the Beat: Tile Expanding Feder-
alization of Crime, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3 (1997). 
109. Rehnquist, supra note 104. 
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the character of the types of cases that federal judges adjudicate, and, 
perhaps most significantly, damaging "our system of federalism. "110 
Third, Congress (as far as federal judges are concerned) added 
insult to injury both by failing to create additional judgeships to meet 
a litigation explosion that is largely its making and by holding up judi-
cial and Sentencing Commission nominations. All of these matters 
have figured prominently in Rehnquist's year-end reports on the fed-
eral judiciary. In January 1998, Rehnquist depicted the Senate's fail-
ure to confirm judicial nominees as threatening to '"erod[e] the qual-
ity of justice."'111 Again in January 1999, he spoke of the need-with 
the increasing federalization of crime-to have "a fully functioning 
Sentencing Commission" and described the "political impasse" be-
tween the President and Congress as "stnnning."112 Finally, in January 
1998 and January 2000, he spoke of the need for Congress to "elimi-
nate the disparity between resources and workload in the Federal ju-
diciary by ... [expanding] ... the number of judges. ,m 
Court-Congress relations, for the reasons detailed above, have 
been at a low ebb during the Rehnquist years.114 And while judges' 
110. /d.; see also id. (calling for a reexamination of diversity jurisdiction, claiming that "there 
is no good reason to keep [these lawsuits] in federal court"); William H. Rchnquist./999 Year-
End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttbljan00ttbljnn2000.html (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Joumal) (calling attention to the increasing 
federalization of crime and arguing for the elimination of "unwarranted fcdcrnlizntion" to "help 
control growth in federal courts and preserve them as courts of limited jurisdiction"); supra note 
92 and accompanying text (noting Rehnquist's objection to the Violence Against Women Act). 
111. John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Imperils Judicial System, Relmquist Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 1998, at A1 (quoting Chief Justice Rchnquist). At that time, one in ten judgeships had 
been vacant with severnl of the vacancies in existence for eighteen or more months. lei. 
1U. Rehnquist, supra note 104. When Rehnquist issued this statement, there were no com-
missioners on the Sentencing Commission and no nominations pcnding.ld. It is also noteworthy 
that the Sentencing Commission, by severely limiting judicial discretion at sentencing, removed 
significant discretionary authority from the courts and vested that power in Congress. James B. 
Bums et al., We Make the Better Targets (But tile Guidelines Shifted Power from tlte Judiciary to 
Congress, Not from the Judicfury to the Proseclllion), 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1317,1317-21 (1997). 
113. William H. Rehnquist./997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, excerpted in Ju-
diciary Report: Congress is Prodded, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at A14; see also Rchnquist, supra 
note 103 (commending Congress for creating ten new district judgeships and urging legislators 
to continue this trend). 
114. Federal judges, including Chief Justice Rehnquist. also have been critical of the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. By regulating the Ylnys district 
courts develop procedures for managing their dockets, the Judicial Conference saw the Act as 
both "subjecting court rules to political whimsy" and violating "the separation of powers doc-
trine by having the legislature manage the workings of the courts." Stephen Labaton, Businas 
and the Law, Eiden's Clzallenge to Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1990, at D2; see also 
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claims about what is in the best interest of the judicial branch may 
"obscure the judges' self-interested personal motivations for pre-
serving and enhancing their own positions in the system,"115 it is nev-
ertheless true that the Supreme Court has ample reason to point the 
finger at Congress for changing (for the worse) the job of being a fed-
eral court judge. It is hardly surprising that this change has occurred 
during the same period that the Court increasingly has struck down 
acts of Congress. The Court's view of Congress is shaped, in part, by 
Congress's interest in addressing matters that the judiciary deems es-
sential to the administration of justice.116 
CONCLUSION: WAKE ME UP WHEN THE REVOLUTION Is OVER 
In determining what deference is owed to Congress, the Justices 
cannot help but think about how seriously Congress takes both the 
Constitution and the Court.117 For this reason, Congress is partially to 
blame for the recent wave of Court decisions invalidating federal 
laws. Poor drafting, including inattention to the signals being sent to 
Congress by the Supreme Court, has figured prominently in this raft 
of decisions. Likewise, Congress's apparent disinterest in preserving 
its power as a coequal interpreter of the Constitution encourages the 
Court to see itself as the ulthnate arbiter of constitutional truth. And 
finally, Congress's "what-me-worry" attitude toward judicial branch 
needs has exacerbated strains between the Court and Congress. 
Rehnquist, supra note 92, at 3B (criticizing the Act for "lessening the traditional freedom of the 
district judge"). 
115. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT 
ADMINISTRATION 133 (1995); see also Neil A. Lewis, Hatch Defends Senate Action on Juclge-
sltips, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1998, at A1 (suggesting that judges were "partly to blame for their 
heavy caseloads"). See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Recle· 
fining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1224-29 (1996) (dis· 
cussing possible methods of facilitating positive interaction between Congress and the courts). 
116. Of course, the Justices' principal concern is the statute the constitutionality of which is 
being challenged. Nevertheless, judicial attitudes toward Congress are likely to be a contributing 
factor in defining the Court's views on Congress's trustworthiness and, with it, the Court's will· 
ingness to take a hard look at Congress's handiwork. See supra note 97 and accompanying text 
(noting the correlation between congressional actions and Supreme Court decisionmaking). 
117. Professor Schroeder, therefore, is correct in calling attention to how "motivated rea· 
soning" affects Court decisionmaking. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 352-56 (reasoning that 
general distrust of the federal government provides Justices with a reason to prefer limiting fed· 
era! power). Just as the Justices (perhaps subconsciously) factor attitudes toward Congress's 
trustworthiness into their decisionmaking, the Justices also are apt to take into account Con-
gress's views about its role in constitutional interpretation. 
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That Congress is partially to blame for bringing back the "Con-
stitution in Exile" cannot be denied. The Rehnquist Court, already 
predisposed to pay close attention to issues involving the scope of 
Congress's power, has seized upon Congress's failure to take seriously 
its role as coequal interpreter of the Constitution. But why is Con-
gress increasingly cavalier in its handling of constitutional questions? 
To begin with, lawmakers' have little incentive to sacrifice their indi-
vidual interests for something as abstract as Congress's institutional 
interest in asserting its voice as coequal interpreter of the Constitu-
tion.118 In particular, members of Congress need to be reelected to ad-
vance their (and their constituents') interests. With little to gain by 
raising constitutional objections to a politically popular bill, lawmak-
ers would rather vote for the measure and leave it to the courts to sort 
out the bill's constitutionality.119 Nothing, of course, is new about this 
practice; nevertheless, several recent developments have conspired to 
make Congress especially insensitive to the constitutional fate of its 
enactments. 
First, Congress not only increasingly delegates its core powers to 
others, but also, in explaining why, it often points the finger at itself 
for the failings of govermnent. Witness, for example, the 1994 Con-
tract with America. Premised on the belief that Congress is irrespon-
sible and unworthy of trust, the Contract with America ostensibly 
sought to limit congressional power in several ways, including by im-
posing term limits, prohibiting unfunded mandates, and creating the 
line-item veto. On the line-item veto, for example, Senator Dan Coats 
and others argued: Congress "cannot discipline itself .... [It] is selfish 
and greedy and ... cannot put the national interest ahead of parochial 
interests or special interests."120 And while the Contract with America 
118. Lawmakers, in other words, are "trapped in a prisoners' dilemma: all might benefit if 
they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress's power, but each has a strong in<:en-
tive to free ride in favor of the local constituency." Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The 
Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & 0RG.132, 144 (1999). 
119. This, in part, explains both the use of expedited review provisions, see supra notes 31-
44 and accompanying text, and the paucity of lawmaker references to recent Supreme Court de-
cisions striking down acts of Congress, see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text. For a 
competing perspective, see Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, /nstiwtional Design of a 
Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE LJ. 1277, 1288 (2001) ("[Slome legislators sometimes treat con-
stitutional argument as one indicator of the 'public interest' or 'good public policy,' which in 
turn has some weight as against legislators' other interests, goals, and aims.''). 
120. Line-Item Veto: Joint Hearing Before tl1e House Comm. on Go,•emment Reform and 
Oversight and the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 22 (1995) (quoting Sen. 
Coats (R-IN)). Moreover, Senator Gordon Humphrey observed: "Congress has flunked the 
test. We do not deserve the status quo. We have flunked. We are dunces, we are truants, we are 
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has fizzled, Congress remains ready, willing, and eager to cede core 
powers-especially budgetary and war powers.121 This pattern is likely 
to continue, for the declining public trust in government creates in-
centives for lawmakers to distance themselves from Congress by en-
gaging in mutual self-flagellation.122 
Second, Congress has little incentive to take recent Supreme 
Court decisions into account and thereby slow down the pace of fed-
eralization because interest groups increasingly prefer national legis-
lation to state and local measures.123 As compared to lobbying fifty 
state legislatures, for example, there is a far lower transaction cost as-
sociated with nationallegislation.124 More significantly, the political 
culture has become increasingly nationalized. Changes both in media 
coverage and advertising have made all politics national-so that 
guns in schools, carjacking, and the like are considered national, not 
local, problems.125 
Third (and relatedly), Congress is not particularly disappointed 
with Court decisionmaking. Unlike during Court-curbing periods, 
many members of Congress now are somewhat sympathetic to, say, 
juvenile deliuquents with the budget." 135 CONG. REc. 28,091 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hum· 
phrey (R-NH)). Needless to say, term limits take aim at Congress in an even more direct way. 
Representative Henry Hyde noted: "The popularity of term limits is a measure of the low cs• 
teem our citizens have for politics and politicians .... [And given the way we} attack eacit other 
and the way we demean this institution in every campaign, it is no wonder we arc held in con· 
tempt." 143 CONG. REc. H470 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde (R·IL)). 
121. For a detailing of the steady and continuing decline of Congress's war and spending 
powers, see generally FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION, supra note 29. 
122 See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 347 (providing a grapit gauging lite rise and fall of pub· 
lie trust in government from 1958-1998). 
123. See generally Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 364-78 
(1997) (describing tite centripetal forces that account for the tendency toward centralization of 
regulatory authority); Marsitall, supra note 106, at 141-47 (discussing Congress's reaction to the 
Supreme Court's revived concern for federalism). 
124. See Friedman, supra note 123, at 373-75 (explaining the economic benefits for interest 
groups in seeking federal, rather than state, regulation); see also Jonathan Macey, Federal Def· 
erence to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public·Choice 
Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 272-73 (1990) (calling attention to the fact that 
it is harder for regulated parties to avoid national, as compared to local, regulation). 
125. See Marshall, supra note 106, at 151-52 (reasoning that media coverage of distant 
crimes creates the impression that crime requires a national solution). Correspondingly, titere is 
little cost to Congress if the Supreme Court invalidates its statutes. In particular, by enacting the 
statute, lawmakers accomplisit their principal objective, that is, signaling to relevant constituents 
that they are working on the problem. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (discussing 
the rise of symbolic legislation). Moreover, Congress, if need be, can respond to lite Supreme 
Court by enacting a narrower version of the bill. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (dis· 
cussing examples). 
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Court efforts to protect state prerogatives.126 For this very reason, 
Representative Lee Hamilton, after observing that lawmakers 
seemed "detached from the actual work of the federal judiciary, par-
ticularly as it relates to the exercise of congressional power," specu-
lated that Congress "has become more couservative, and many mem-
bers are comfortable with most of the Court's rulings."127 Moreover, 
Supreme Court decisions have not prevented Congress from re-
sponding to constituent demands. Congress has the tools to respond 
to many of these decisions. For example, it can recraft a bill by 
grounding it in a different source of federal power or it can narrow its 
scope.128 Finally, because much of what is struck down is redundant of 
state enactments, Congress will feel relatively little constituent pres-
sure to respond to the Court.129 
Fourth, Congress increasingly is concerned with "message poli-
tics," that is, using the legislative process to make a symbolic state-
ment to voters and other constituents.130 Rather than look to commit-
126. When Court decisionmaking has upset the constituencies of individual members of 
Congress (for example, in the case of court-ordered busing or the rejection of early New Deal 
legislation), Congress had a reason to defend its institutional prerogatives and pressure the 
Court to follow Congress's understanding of the Constitution. When Congress is not at war with 
the Court, however, the individual interests of its members diverge from the institutional inter-
est of defending Congress's constitutional power as coequal interpreter of the Constitution. See 
supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (detailing why Congress-when it comes to inter-
preting the Constitution-has little incentive to figltt for its institutional prerogatives). 
127. 144 CONG. REc. E48 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hamilton (D-IN)). 
128. See Gerhardt, supra note 85, at 10988-90 (explaining how Congress can make better 
use of its treaty and spending powers); see also T.R. Goldman, Lawmakers Take Steps to Re-
spond After Legislation Is Found Unco11stitlltional, LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 8 (arguing 
that Congress can enact more comprehensive regulatory schemes than those struck down by the 
Court); Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Qause Review Have Perverse Effects? 1-5 (Oct. 
28, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for "New Voices on the New Federnlism," Villa-
nova Law School, Oct. 28, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Joumal) (same); supra note 58 and 
accompanying text (discussing examples of congressional responses); infra note 138 and accom-
panying text (discussing how the Court benefits from such an incremental strategy). 
129. See infra notes 130-133 and accompanying text (discussing how Congress seems espe-
cially interested in approving symbolic legislation). Furthermore, were the Supreme Court to 
shut the door on federal initiatives, constituents still could seek relief from state lawmakers. 
Following the Snpreme Court's rejection of Congress's efforts to extend the Americans '1\ith 
Disabilities Act to state agencies, for example, several states passed legislation waiving their 
immunity to federnl ADA lawsuits. See Helen Irvin, Several States Respond to Garrett Decision, 
Consider Waiving Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 70 U.S.L.W. 2003 (2001) (discussing bills re-
cently introduced in Minnesota, Rhode Island, California, and New York). 
130. See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Message Politics: Party Campaigning and Legislative 
Strategy in Congress (Aug. 2000) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Po-
liticnl Science Association) (unpublished manuseript, on file with the Duke Law Joumal) (ar-
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tee leadership to define Congress's agenda, Republicans and Demo-
crats alike see the lawmaking process as expressive, a way for the 
members of each party to coalesce behind their party's policy 
agenda.131 Likewise, by focusing its efforts on the message it is send-
ing, Congress places less emphasis on what happens to legislation af-
ter it is enacted. Instead of negotiating with the president over the 
specifics of legislation (so as to stave off a possible veto), "Congress 
can, and routinely does, pass laws deliberately designed to provoke a 
presidential veto."132 Likewise, a Court decision striking down legisla-
tion is not especially problematic. Indeed, the Court's decision creates 
an occasion for Congress to revisit the issue and, in tlris way, facili-
tates lawmaker efforts to, once again, send a symbolic message to 
voters and other constituents.133 
Congress has yet to see the return of the "Constitution in Exile" 
as especially problematic. The changing face of lawmaking places less 
emphasis on securing presidential and judicial approval of legislation 
and more emphasis on doing what is politically popular (federalizing 
crime, for example). So long as the Court is not standing in the way of 
urgent constituent demands, there is little reason for Congress to 
break out of this pattern. In other words, the constitutional counter-
revolution that so preoccupies legal academics appears little more 
than a blip on Congress's radar screen. 
For the Rehnquist Court, however, Congress's apparent indiffer-
ence to its rulings is anything but insignificant. The Court waited until 
the 1994 elections before launching its counterrevolution, and even 
then the Court moved gingerly-striking down relatively few laws 
and striking them down on somewhat ambiguous grounds.134 Today, 
guing that "message politics" shapes the strategic decisions of legislators at all stages of the 
lawmaking process). 
131. /d. at 3. 
132. See John B. Gilmour, Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto, J. 
POL. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
133. And with voters expecting less and less of Congress, it may be that this type of signnl 
satisfies lawmakers' needs to get something done (that they can report back to their constitu· 
ents). See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 336-38 (detailing voters' lower expectations for congres• 
sional performance). 
134. Most notably, following the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995), there was reason to think that the Court's sole complaint with the guns-near-schools 
laws was the paucity of legislative factfinding. See Philip Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congres· 
sional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. 
REv. 695, 703 (1996) (contrasting the Fifth Circuit's focus on the absence of findings with the 
Supreme Court's concession that their absence simply negated one source of support); see also 
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however, the Court seems more aggressive, and with good reason. 
Congress, if anything, is encouraging the Court through both indiffer-
ence and ill-considered legislation. Moreover, there is little reason to 
fear a populist backlash like the one launched against Loc/mer-era 
judicial decisionmaking.135 The Court remains politically popular06 
and somewhat middle-of-the-road on divisive social policy issues such 
as late-term abortions and school prayer.137 Also, when the Court 
strikes down a law, it typically leaves Congress room to revisit the is-
sue.138 
Of course, it is not impossible that the Court's increased \villing-
ness to invalidate Congress's statutes will become a politically salient 
issue-one that spurs Congress into action.139 As the New Deal 
Whittington, supra note 95, at 479 (arguing that the "Court bas moved carefully but steadily to 
reestablish some federalism-based constraints on the national government"). 
135. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting that popular opinion, in part. ani-
mated the 1937 revolution). "Lochner-era" refers, of course, to the years follo\\ing the Court's 
decision in Lodmer v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905), invalidating a New York labor law as 
violative of an employee's Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of contract. 
136. In his 1999 year-end report. for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist approvingly cited a 
February 1999 Gallup Poll showing that "80 percent of Americans surveyed stated that they bad 
a 'great deal' or 'fair' amount of trust in the judicial branch of go,•emment, far exceeding figures 
for the other branches." Rehnquist, supra note 110. For the Supreme Court, 81 percent of 
Americans, in a June 2001 Gallup Poll, said they have "some," "quite a lot," or a "great deal" of 
confidence in the Supreme Court. Confidence ill Institutions, Gallup.com, at http:/lwww.gallup. 
com/pollrmdicatorsfmdconfideuce.asp#RelatedAnalyses (June 8-10, 2001) (on file \\ith the 
Duke Law Journal). In other words, the Supreme Court does not appear to have suffered much 
harm for its participation in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See also Wendy W. Simmons, 
Election Controversy Apparenrly Drove Partisan Wedge into Arrirudes Towartls Supreme Court, 
Gallup.com, at bttp:!lwww.gaUup.com/poWreleaseslprOlOll6.asp (Jan. 16, 2001) (on ftle with the 
Duke Law Journal) (noting that, in its immediate aftermath, Bush ~·. Gore affected Democratic 
and Republican attitudes toward the Court). 
137. For assessments of the 2001 Term (aU of which suggest that the Court. rather than be-
ing hard-line, was difficult to pigeonhole), see Alan M. Dershowitz, Curious Fallom from Bush 
v. Gore, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A15; Richard W. Garnett, Disrobed! AcruaUy, They Tllink 
for Themselves, WASH. POST, July 1, 2001, at B2; Greenhouse, supra note 1, at Al. On the ques-
tion of whether the Lodmer-era Court preserved political capital by strategically packaging its 
decisions, see Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court-
Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1139, 1139 (1987) (arguing that the Court was hugely suc-
cessful in "shap[ing] events and buildfmg] up institutional support \\ith a series of well-timed 
decisions"). 
138. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings 
and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Readi11g ofUnited States v. Lopez, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. 
REv. 757, 776-79 (1996) (employing positive political theory to argue that, after declaring a 
statute unconstitutional, the Court encourages an equilibrium among the branches by leaving 
the door open for Congress to revisit its handiwork). 
139. Furthermore, the Court itself is an issue-but not because of its anti-Congress dcci-
sionmaking. Concerned with abortion, civil rights, and civil liberties, the Senate Ju,diciary Com-
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Court's exiling of the Lochner-era decisionmaking suggests, the Jus-
tices can make the Court a political issue by frustrating a broad popu-
list mandate.14° For example, if the face of Congress changes, it is pos-
sible that the Court may find itself out-of-step with the policy 
preferences of lawmakers. Indeed, because Democrats now control 
the confirmation of federal court appointees, lawmakers-interested 
in limiting the George W. Bush administration's power to shape fed-
eral court decisionmaking-rnay try to make the Court an issue. Also, 
the Justices' growing confidence in their anti-Congress agenda (espe-
cially if fueled by Bush appointees willing to push the enveloge even 
further) may result in rulings that prod Congress into action. 41 Until 
that time, however, Congress is likely to sit back and wait out the 
purported return of the "Constitution in Exile." Its motto (if it had 
the energy to have one): "Wake Me Up When the Revolution is 
Over." 
mittee is now engaged in a battle over what role, if any, ideology should play in the selection 
and confirmation of judges. See Charles E. Schumer, Judging by Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
2001, at A19 (arguing iliat senators should use ideology when examining judicial nominees); 
Byron York, More Hearings, More Delays, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, at http://www. 
nationalreview.com/york/york062601.shtml (June 26, 2001) (on file wiili the Duke Law Journal) 
(same); Meet the Press: Senators Charles Schumer and Jeff Sessions Discuss Whether Personal 
Ideology Should Mauer When Confirming Federal Judiciary Nominees (NBC television broad· 
cast, July 1, 2001) (transcript on file wiili tile Duke Law Journal) (same). 
140. See Caldeira, supra note 137, at 1143-44 (discussing tile relationship between media 
coverage of tile Supreme Court and support for Court-packing); Richard Funston, The Supreme 
Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 802 {1975) (noting the decline and sub· 
sequent rise in Court prestige after tile Civil War and its impact on judicial ability to direct pub· 
lie policy). 
141. Following tile Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York 
and on tile Pentagon, it is possible iliat tile Justices will slow down their efforts to limit Con· 
gress. In particular, social and political forces may dictate iliat the Court pay greater respect to 
the federal government. Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Amhority?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at 4. Willi iliat said, iliere is little reason to think that tlte Court will dis· 
avow its recent decisions limiting Congress's power. It seems more likely that tlte Court will 
steer away from iliese disputes (at least in tile near future) by making use of certiorari denials 
and oilier delaying strategies. Also, on questions iliat have no direct relationship to national Se• 
curity, it is possible-albeit less likely now ilian before-that the Court will continue to limit 
Congress's power. 
